


# REPORT ON HATE SPEECH MONITORING IN THE 2024 INDONESIA REGIONAL ELECTIONS





# **Report on Hate Speech Monitoring in The 2024 Indonesia Regional Elections**

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## Executive Summary

This publication is the second edition in a series of reports on monitoring hate speech during Indonesia 2024 political cycle. The first report, which focused on hate speech against vulnerable groups during the 2024 General Elections, was released on August 8, 2024. This current edition shifts focus to the 2024 Regional Head Elections (Pilkada), with targeted monitoring conducted in five selected provinces: Aceh, West Sumatra, West Java, North Maluku, and West Nusa Tenggara.

The observation period for hate speech targeting vulnerable groups in the context of the 2024 Pilkada ran from August 1 to December 17, 2024. The analysis was confined to original posts or primary content, with amplified or redistributed material (e.g., retweets) excluded due to their frequent dissemination by coordinated networks, including buzzers and bots. A total of 479,350 texts were collected from two platforms—X and TikTok. Of these, 49,587 texts (10.34%) were identified as containing hate speech, while 320,966 texts (66.96%) were directly related to the Pilkada.

In terms of distribution channels, the highest volume of hate speech was found in TikTok comment sections, comprising 26,301 entries (53.04%). This was followed by content on platform X, which accounted for 20,335 entries (41.01%), and hate speech embedded in TikTok video content, comprising 2,951 instances (5.95%).

Among the five monitored regions, the Aceh Regional Election recorded the highest volume of hate speech, with a total of 8,367 texts. This was followed by West Java with 7,282 texts, West Nusa Tenggara with 2,005 texts, North Maluku with 1,577 texts, and West Sumatra with 1,549 texts.

An analysis of hate speech content on social media platforms reveals a recurring use of disability-related language in a derogatory context. Terms such as *blind*, *deaf*, *idiot*, *crazy*, and *stupid*—which denote specific physical or psychological conditions—were frequently used as slurs to demean individuals or groups. A total of 5,581 texts, representing approximately 11.25% of all hate speech instances identified during the observation

period, contained such language. This pattern aligns with findings from the 2024 Presidential Election, where hate speech predominantly targeted individuals with disabilities, particularly focusing on terms related to mental health.

In the 2024 Regional Head Elections, the group most frequently targeted by hate speech was the LGBTQ+ community with 4,779 texts. This was followed by the Rohingya (937 texts), Catholics (877 texts), Chinese (760 texts), Israelis (754 texts), Christians (456 texts), Shia Muslims (204 texts), Ahmadiyya (158 texts), and other ethnic groups (139 texts). Additionally, 35,999 texts containing hate speech did not specify a target group but instead included general hate speech against women and adherents of indigenous beliefs.

These findings highlight that hate speech remains a persistent, undemocratic phenomenon during electoral periods. While the government has made several efforts to prevent and address hate speech during elections, this report suggests that more effective measures are needed. These measures include enhancing inclusive political education for citizens, strengthening the capacity of vulnerable groups to respond to hate speech, and urging social media platforms to enforce responsive content moderation policies to protect vulnerable groups from harmful behaviors and content in the digital space.

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# Chapter 1.

# Introduction

## Chapter 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Background

The findings from the monitoring of hate speech during the 2024 General Elections reveal that vulnerable groups continue to be significant targets. Repressive language directed at these groups was identified in approximately 200,000 texts across social media platforms such as X, Facebook, and Instagram. Of these, around 77,000 texts were directly related to the election. This hate speech has contributed to the shrinking of digital civil space for vulnerable groups, heightened discrimination, increased self-censorship, and the erosion of voting rights and broader participation in electoral processes (Report on Hate Speech Monitoring against Vulnerable Groups in the 2024 General Elections).

This hate speech phenomenon is expected to recur during the 2024 Regional Head Elections (Pilkada), which were held simultaneously across all provinces, districts, and cities. As observed in previous Pilkada events, vulnerable groups remained the primary targets of hate speech. For example, during the 2018 Bogor City Pilkada, one regional head candidate encouraged the public to criminalize the LGBTQ+ community, particularly transgender individuals. As a result, the transgender community in Bogor became more vulnerable to discriminatory treatment, as their gender identity was made more visible through their physical appearance. Additionally, local mass organizations in Bogor took action to criminalize transgender individuals. One transgender person, a member of the Transvoice organization, even being expelled after the discriminatory campaign. A similar situation was seen during the 2020 West Sumatra Pilkada, where a regional head candidate promised “moral reform” to address the LGBTQ+ issues, framing them as corrupting moral values. This promise was even promoted through paid Facebook advertisements (Maharddhika & Salabi, 2021).

Local political competition which is closer to the public, has the potential to trigger sharper conflicts. In such situations, divisive messages using hate speech are often employed to gain public support effectively. The 2017 Jakarta Regional Election (Pilkada) serves as a prime example of how hate speech and incitement were strategically used against the Chinese minority

and Christian groups to discredit opponents and secure electoral victory. This resulted in religious polarization, leading to the criminalization of political actors from the Chinese-Christian minority groups (Azziza, 2019).

In light of this background, the Indonesian Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) and the Monash Data & Democracy Research Hub conducted monitoring of hate speech targeting vulnerable groups on social media during the 2024 Regional Head Elections. Social media was chosen as the monitoring locus for at least three reasons. First, it is the primary platform where hate speech is most widely disseminated. Perpetrators feel emboldened to engage in hate speech under the protection of anonymity (Pukallus & Arthur, 2024). Second, hate speech on social media is more easily monitored compared to direct, face-to-face hate speech. Furthermore, hate speech on social media often reflects latent societal hatred that is typically not expressed in face-to-face interactions, which are perceived as more risky both physically and legally (Brown, 2018). Third, hate speech is frequently linked with disinformation. Through provocative narratives, this behavior opens up the potential for greater conflict and incitement to violence (Jalli, 2024). Therefore, monitoring hate speech on social media allows for early identification of the politicization of hatred, which can help prevent physical violence against vulnerable groups.

Monitoring hate speech on social media is a complex task, as it is heavily influenced by the cultural, historical, and social context of both the perpetrators and the targets. As a result, developing a universal classifier for hate speech across different social media platforms remains challenging and requires sustained efforts to ensure accurate findings (Wijanarko et al., 2024).

Amid these challenges, this monitoring initiative aims to document widespread instances of hate speech that lack meaningful content moderation by social media platforms, particularly in five provinces: Aceh, West Sumatra, West Java, North Maluku, and West Nusa Tenggara. These provinces were selected due to their high vulnerability, as identified by the General Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) in the 2024 Pilkada Vulnerability Index. West Sumatra is also included in the monitoring due to its history of hate speech targeting vulnerable groups during the 2020 Pilkada. The documentation gathered from these five regions will form the

basic for policy recommendations for stakeholders, including the government, social media platforms, and civil society communities or groups.

Academically, this report aims to contribute to the discourse on hate speech targeting vulnerable groups during elections, using both quantitative and qualitative approaches. While studies on hate speech in social media have typically employed qualitative methods, there is limited empirical research focusing on the specific impacts faced by vulnerable groups during political events. Existing studies predominantly examine hate speech phenomena in Western democratic countries, particularly in English-speaking contexts, where there is a favorable climate for freedom of expression. There is a need for more research addressing the unique vulnerabilities of these groups during local elections in developing countries, non-English-speaking nations, and competitive authoritarian regimes like Indonesia.

Furthermore, this study aims to explore the actors responsible for hate speech during local elections. Scientific reports identifying perpetrators of hate speech are generally localized to specific countries. Thus, this Indonesia-focused report will contribute to the international literature on hate speech targeting vulnerable groups during local elections.

## **1.2. Objectives**

The objectives of this report are as follows:

1. To document evidence of hate speech against vulnerable groups during the 2024 Regional Head Elections (Pilkada).
2. To collect data on the distribution of hate speech targeting vulnerable groups across social media platforms; and
3. To provide recommendations to stakeholders aimed at enhancing the protection of vulnerable groups during electoral periods.

## **1.3. Research Questions**

1. How much hate speech content targeting vulnerable groups was disseminated during the 2024 Regional Head Elections (Pilkada), both overall and specifically in the five provinces?

2. On which social media platforms was hate speech targeting vulnerable groups most widely disseminated?
3. Which vulnerable groups were most frequently targeted by hate speech?
4. What issues were used by perpetrators to attack vulnerable groups during the Pilkada?
5. What were the dominant narrative patterns of hate speech during the 2024 Pilkada?

## 1.4. Literature Review

Several studies on hate speech have been conducted, providing valuable references and frameworks for examining hate speech targeting vulnerable groups during elections. These studies have established conceptual frameworks for identifying hate speech, including definitions, categories, and types. Other academic works have also explored the impact of hate speech, particularly on minority groups, both physically and non-physically, such as the erosion of political rights.

### 1.4.1. Hate Speech Definition

Hate speech has long been defined as a form of hate crime. In 1982, Richard Delgado, an American legal scholar, wrote in his famous book *"Words that Wound"* that hate speech is "language directed at a defendant with the intent to demean the defendant's race." This concept was later expanded to the broader public sphere by Kant Greenawalt, Delgado's colleague, in 1989. The definition of hate speech evolved to mean "the act of writing or speaking publicly with the intent to incite hatred against another group based on differences in gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, physical disability, or religion." With these two definitions, the scope of hate speech targets was broadened. Initially it focused on individuals from minority races, but later extended to include other subordinated identities. Additionally, the meaning of hate speech shifted from merely demeaning to actively inciting hatred.

Subsequently, in 1998, the concept of hate speech was further developed within the field of political science. American Political Science Professor Kenneth Ward defined hate speech as "any form of expression used to

vilify, embarrass, or incite hatred against its target." Cohen and Almagor further refined this definition with more specific terms.

*"Hate speech is biased, hostile, and malicious speech directed at an individual or group based on certain inherent or perceived characteristics (by the perpetrator). This speech expresses discriminatory attitudes, intimidation, disagreement, antagonism, and/or prejudice toward these characteristics, which may include gender, race, religion, ethnicity, skin color, nationality, disability, or sexual orientation. Hate speech aims to harm, demean, harass, intimidate, belittle, and victimizing the targeted group, as well as to incite discrimination and violence against them." (Cohen & Almagor, 2013).*


Based on existing concepts, the United Nations (UN) defines hate speech as "any form of communication, whether spoken, written, or behavioral, that attacks or uses language that is degrading or discriminatory toward an individual or group based on religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, skin color, descent, gender, or other identities" (UN.org, 2023). This definition includes three key attributes of hate speech. First, it encompasses all forms of expression, including images, cartoons, memes, objects, gestures, and symbols, which can be disseminated both offline and online. Second, it is "discriminatory" (biased, fanatic, or intolerant) or "demeaning" (prejudiced, insulting, or belittling) to individuals or groups. Third, it targets "identity factors" that are either real or perceived in an individual or group. This definition is used to address hate speech that violates human rights (HR). The UN definition is the one we applied in monitoring hate speech during the 2024 Regional Elections.

It is important to note that hate speech differs from political commentary that critiques policies, actors, or political situations (Das, Asif, Anik & Hossain, 2021). Criticism of politics or political figures within the context of political contests is considered as a legitimate exercise of freedom of expression.

The International Foundation for Electoral Support (IFES, 2019) developed the concept of hate speech across five aspects: actors, messages, dissemination patterns, message recipients, and risks. The actors or

perpetrators are typically motivated by certain political views or beliefs when producing hate speech messages. These messages often contain defamation, derogatory language, or promote intolerance and violence against individuals or groups based on race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, or other identities. Hate speech is then disseminated through both traditional media and social media, often accompanied by disinformation. The content is received and processed by the public, and this process generates various security risks.

Figure 1. Five Aspects of Hate Speech



Source: IFES, 2019.

### 1.4.3. Categories and Types of Hate Speech

Several scholars have categorized the types of hate speech. For instance, Widyatnyana, Rasna & Putrayasa (2023) categorize hate speech into six types as follows:

1. **Insult:** Messages that offend feelings and demean the dignity of an individual or group.
2. **Defamation:** Messages that tarnish the reputation of an individual or group, which are not in accordance with the truth.

3. **Blasphemy:** Messages that belittle an individual or group.
4. **Unpleasant Acts:** Illegal actions that force others to do, refrain from doing, or allow something, involving violence.
5. **Hoaxes:** False or misleading information spread with the intent to cause public panic.
6. **Provocation:** Efforts to incite public anger and incite the public to take actions as desired by the perpetrator.

The inclusion of hoaxes as one of the categories of hate speech is also supported by Jana Papcunova et al. (2021). This research is a valuable contribution to the field of hate speech, as it helps to develop tools for operationalizing the identification of hate speech. The public can assess hate speech through ten indicators:

1. It contains sexist language.
2. It targets minority groups, such as xenophobia, anti-Semitism, ageism, and discrimination based on disability, ethnicity, nationality or religious groups, with the aim of inciting intolerance or hatred toward these identities.
3. It involves the denial of fundamental human rights, including calls for the exclusion or segregation of an individual or group.
4. It encourages violent behavior.
5. It includes hashtags, labels, and symbols referring to organizations that commit racial crimes.
6. It involves ad hominem attacks or personal assaults on someone's character or motives, based on emotions or prejudice, rather than facts and logic.
7. It reinforces stereotypes that minorities are inherently negative.
8. It contains ambiguous statements, irony, and sarcasm, often mocking an idea or event.
9. It includes manipulative texts aimed at deceiving or harming others.
10. It includes insults and vulgarity.

The categorization of hate speech is also formulated by the Dangerous Speech Project (DSP). The five categories of hate speech according to DSP are dehumanization, justification of violence, accusations of treason, attacks on vulnerable groups, and narratives threatening group integrity. A

person or group may be portrayed as threatening national unity or accused of being traitors who often harm the “natives”.

Adapting the categories from these studies and contextualizing them within the situation in Indonesia, Monash University Indonesia and the Indonesian Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) have applied five categories of hate speech. These categories serve as the foundation for the operationalization of hate speech monitoring conducted during the 2024 Presidential Election and the 2024 Regional Elections across all regions. The five categories are outlined in the following table.

*Table 1. Categorisation of Hate Speech in Indonesia*

Profanity	Messages that contain toxicity, including harsh, obscene, or inappropriate language, which contradicts prevailing social norms. These utterances may be considered offensive or unpleasant by most individuals.
Insult	Messages that use offensive, impolite, or mocking language intended to humiliate the target.
Threats or incitement to violence	Messages that contain hatred intended to cause significant harm, danger, or distress to an individual or group, including threats of physical violence, intimidation, or actions that instill fear or concern in the target of the hatred.
Attacks on ethnicity, religion, race, intergroup, and sexual orientation or gender	Messages that demean or attack the identity of an individual or group based on ethnicity, religion, race, intergroup relations, sexual orientation, or gender.
Sexism or vulgarity	Messages that reference sexual activities or genitalia with the intent to harass specific individuals or groups.

### 1.4.3. Impact of Hate Speech

The impacts of hate speech are wide-ranging. According to the IFES in “*Disinformation Campaigns and Hate Speech: Exploring the Relationship and Programming Interventions*” (2019), there are four primary effects. *First*, it fosters or amplifies hatred toward specific ethnicities, religions, races, and other identity-based sentiments. *Second*, it encourages bias and discriminatory treatment toward victims. *Third*, it hinders victims from fully participating in spaces that should be accessible to them, such as engaging in policy discussions and rights advocacy during elections. *Fourth*, it escalates horizontal conflicts within society, particularly in communities already experiencing polarization. In extreme cases, hate speech can result in mass deportations or genocide. Hatred and hostile messages ultimately instill fear, which can influence and control the decisions and behaviors of targeted individuals and groups—disrupting or even stripping away their fundamental human rights.

Hate speech can also significantly harm individual political figures who belong to vulnerable identities such as those from certain ethnicities, religions, or other minority groups. During elections, discrediting tactics accompanied by hate speech can negatively impact both a candidate’s electability and personal safety. For example, during the 2016 United States presidential election, Hillary Clinton, the female candidate, became a target of misogynistic and sexist attacks. Malicious actors questioned her physical and mental fitness in ways rarely applied to male candidates. Clinton ultimately lost the election to Donald Trump (Shepard & Nolan, 2019). Similarly, during the 2022 Philippine presidential election, Leni Robredo suffered defeat after a relentless campaign of misogynistic hate speech and disinformation orchestrated by supporters of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. (Rappler, May 1, 2022). Gender-based hate speech and attacks on other minority identities were also experienced by U.S. politicians such as Kamala Harris (Summers, October 9, 2020), Ilhan Omar, Rashida Tlaib (New York Times, November 5, 2019), and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (Thier, July 24, 2020)—all of whom possess intersecting marginalized identities, including being women, people of color, immigrants, and, in the cases of Omar and Tlaib, Muslims.

Additionally, hate speech during elections has the potential to disrupt and ultimately deny the voting and participatory rights of vulnerable groups (Maharddhika & Salabi, 2021). In the 2019 Indonesian general election, hate speech that perpetuated stigma and disinformation about the eligibility and voting rights of individuals with psychosocial disabilities effectively led to the denial of their right to vote. Such harmful content even influenced election officials, who became hesitant or unwilling to facilitate voting rights for people with mental disabilities living in social care institutions.

The loss of voting and participatory rights also affected LGBT communities during the same election. Both individually and collectively, LGBT voters felt afraid to voice their opinions and engage in advocacy. Transgender individuals, in particular, refrained from visiting polling stations due to frequent verbal abuse and bullying related to their appearance and clothing. Hate speech targeting LGBT people and those with mental disabilities has compounded the already existing barriers to participation, especially given that administrative challenges in accessing voting rights remain unresolved (Maharddhika & Salabi, 2021).

Regarding the process of the "escalation" of violence as a consequence of hate speech, the Anti-Defamation League has developed the concept of the Pyramid of Hate. In this framework, various forms of hate speech serve both as catalysts and justifications for stereotyping individuals or groups as scapegoats. Over time, this blame-oriented mindset can evolve into hatred, which in turn, may escalate into violence and even genocide.

Figure 2. Pyramid of hate



Source: Anti-Defamation League, 2018.

The illustration above highlights the varying levels of danger posed by different forms of biased or hateful behavior toward individuals and groups, particularly those who are vulnerable. The higher the level within the pyramid, the more severe and potentially fatal the consequences. Alarming, biased behaviors at the lower levels are often regarded as “normal” or tolerated. Yet, much like a physical pyramid, the base supports the upper layers (Anti-Defamation League, 2018). In such a context, minority and marginalized communities become the most vulnerable to discriminatory acts and violence—especially when they also face economic hardship. For instance, a transgender street performer during the 2018 Bogor mayoral election was subjected to harassment and expulsion.

Based on existing literature and past incidents during electoral moments in Indonesia, Monash University Indonesia and the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) Indonesia have monitored hate speech targeting LGBTQ+ communities, Shiites, Ahmadis, Chinese Christians, women, Jews, and Rohingya. Politicians from marginalized groups may also be subjected to hate speech, however, they typically have sufficient resources to respond and defend themselves. This is not the case for vulnerable communities who face multiple layers of disadvantage—including limited access to education, economic opportunities, social support, and legal assistance.


# **Chapter 2.**

# **Methodology of Hate Speech Monitoring**

## Chapter 2. Methodology of Hate Speech Monitoring

To develop an automated hate speech monitoring system, several stages are required, including the collection of online conversational data, data processing, data annotation, artificial intelligence (AI) model training, AI model deployment, and the visualization of monitoring results (Figure 3). Each of these processes will be explained in detail below.

Figure 3. Research Process Flow



### Methodology

#### 2.1 Data Collection

Data were collected from two social media platforms: X and TikTok, covering the period from August 1, 2024, to December 12, 2024. During the data scraping process, reposts or shared posts on Twitter were excluded. For TikTok, due to limitations of the TikTok API, comments on posts with more than 100 comments could not be retrieved. A set of keywords was used as a reference for text extraction. To ensure data could be gathered from each province, province-specific keywords were configured as follows:

(nama kandidat gubernur OR nama kandidat walikota ibukota provinsi OR nama kandidat walikota yang kontroversial) OR (“pilkada/kampanye/kandidat/kpu/cagub” AND (nama provinsi OR nama kota yang kontroversial))

Using the keyword patterns described above, a total of 95,854 tweets were collected from X, 21,271 TikTok videos, and 132,751 TikTok comments. In addition, texts that specifically mentioned or referred to vulnerable groups were also collected. These texts were retrieved using a different set of keywords; however, a limitation of this method was that the province associated with the text could not be identified, as outlined in Appendix A. By using various hate expressions targeting vulnerable groups as keywords, a total of 47,930 texts were obtained from X, 119,971 from TikTok videos, and 213,224 from TikTok comments.

## 2.2 Data Processing

To ensure high-quality data, several preprocessing steps were carried out, including the following:

- Removing duplicate texts (often caused by repeated posts or indications of coordinated activity by buzzers).
- Eliminating texts containing fewer than four words, as these are generally insufficient for meaningful interpretation.
- Filtering out posts from X identified as online loan promotions, spam, or advertisements.

After the data was cleaned, sampling was conducted using a boosted random sampling method, in preparation for annotation by human annotators. Boosted random sampling is a technique that modifies standard random sampling by assigning greater weights to certain data—typically those that are less frequent or more challenging to classify in previous iterations. The primary objective is to increase the representation of hate speech content, which tends to be underrepresented in the annotation dataset.

The annotated data will subsequently be used to train the AI model. The boosted random sampling method was applied to ensure that, on average,

one out of every five texts selected for annotation contains either hate speech or references to vulnerable groups. The remaining unannotated data will later be processed and classified by the AI model.

## **2.3 Data Annotation**

Ten annotators from five provinces were hired to categorize hate speech data. These annotators included journalists and social science lecturers. The annotation process consists of two phases: the training phase and the main annotation phase. During the training phase, annotators were trained to align their understanding of hate speech and hate speech targeting vulnerable groups. They were then given 100 identical texts to evaluate, and the level of agreement among the annotators was measured. If the agreement level was satisfactory, they were able to proceed to the main annotation phase.

The main annotation phase was carried out in three stages to ensure that the texts were annotated according to the established schedule and timeline. In each stage, annotators were provided with texts related to the local elections in their respective provinces. For example, annotators from West Java received texts about the Bandung or West Java local elections, while annotators from West Sumatra were given texts related to the West Sumatra elections, such as those in Padang, Bukittinggi, and other areas of the province. This method ensured that texts from each province could be categorized accurately, even if written in local languages.


## **2.4 AI Model Training and Validation**

### **2.4.1 Total Training Data**

Each province had a different amount of training data. This variation was due to the data validation process and the availability of data on social media. Data from each region was annotated by two annotators. For training purposes, only data that was labeled as toxic or non-toxic by both annotators was used. If a text was labeled as toxic by only one annotator, it was not used in training.

Training data also undergoes a ratio balancing process, where the number of non-toxic texts was limited to three times the number of toxic texts for each region. The total training data per region is as follows.

- **Aceh**
  - Toxic: 1.165
  - Non-toxic: 2.013
- **Jawa Barat**
  - Toxic: 43
  - Non-toxic: 129
- **Maluku Utara**
  - Toxic: 2.650
  - Non-toxic: 4.043
- **Nusa Tenggara Barat**
  - Toxic: 149
  - Non-toxic: 447
- **Sumatera Barat**
  - Toxic: 1.770
  - Non-toxic: 5.310



### 2.4.2 AI Model Training

Using the fine-tuning approach, we further trained the IndoBERTweet model (Koto et al., EMNLP 2021), which was originally trained on Indonesian social media text data from X. Fine-tuning is a method of training an existing AI model to better understand the context of hate speech in regional languages. This specification was necessary because the formal use of Indonesian differs significantly from the informal, non-standard Indonesian found on social media. The fine-tuning process was conducted five times on the model (once per region), resulting in five different models.

Machine learning algorithms were trained to identify toxic content based on data labeled by human annotators. Optimization was performed using the AdamW algorithm with a standard learning rate of  $5 * 10^{-5}$ . Each model was trained for three epochs with a batch size of 16. Other parameters were set to the standard values provided by HuggingFace.

### 2.4.3 AI Model Performance

The model performance was evaluated using a stratified k-fold process with a value of k equal to 5. In each stratified fold, the model was trained using 80% of the available data, with the remaining 20% used for evaluation. This process was repeated five times across different data splits or folds. This method was employed to assess the model's performance on each subset of the evaluation data. The reported performance is the average performance across all stratified folds.

*Table 2. AI Performance in Toxicity Detection in Each Province*

Region	Toxicity			
	accuracy	toksik_f1	non_toksik_f1	macro_f1
Aceh	0.821	0.637	0.881	<b>0.759</b>
Jawa Barat	0.86	0.707	0.907	<b>0.807</b>
Maluku Utara	0.838	0.663	0.893	<b>0.778</b>
Nusa Tenggara Barat	0.889	0.792	0.933	<b>0.8625</b>
Sumatera Barat	0.787	0.467	0.866	<b>0.7066666667</b>

All reported metrics have a value range from 0 to 1. The higher the model's metric value, the better its performance. The reported metrics are as follows:

- **Accuracy** is a standard metric in classification, indicating the model's ability to predict text accurately in a general sense.
- **Macro F1** is a popular metric in classification, representing the average F1 score across all classes. In this case, there are only two classes: toxic and non-toxic.
- **Class F1** (F1 per class) is a metric that balances precision (the accuracy of predictions for a specific class) and recall (the coverage of predictions for a specific class).

# Chapter 3.

# Monitoring Findings

## Chapter 3. Monitoring Findings

### 3.1. General Findings

**B**y inputting the keywords described in the methodology section, a total of 479,350 texts were collected from X and TikTok during the monitoring period. Of these, 320,966 texts (66.96%) were related to the local elections (Pilkada), and 49,587 texts (10.34%) contained hate speech. Among the identified hate speech content, the majority was found in TikTok comments (26,301 or 53.04%). This was followed by 20,335 texts (41.01%) found on X, and 2,951 texts (5.95%) found in TikTok video content.

In general, hate speech expressed on social media often uses words associated with disability groups, such as “blind”, “deaf”, “idiot”, “crazy”, and “stupid”. While these words can carry denotative meanings, referring to specific physical or mental conditions, in the context of hate speech, they all carry negative connotations. A total of 5,581 texts, or approximately 11.25% of the total hate speech, used these terms. This pattern mirrored the 2024 Presidential Election, where the majority of offensive language targeted disability, particularly mental disabilities.


Regarding the categories of hate speech, an annotation conducted with the help of local annotators revealed that the most dominant type of hate speech was insults (65.65%), primarily directed at fellow candidates. The second most common type was attacks on identity (15.22%), which primarily targeted LGBTQ+ groups and female candidates. Profanity (11.56%) was the third most frequent form of hate speech identified in the analysis by the local annotator. Other types included incitement to violence (5.89%) and sexual attacks (1.66%).

The most prevalent hate speech was directed at the LGBTQ+ community (4,779 texts), followed by the Rohingya (937 texts), Catholics (877 texts), Chinese (760 texts), Israelis (754 texts), Christians (456 texts), Shia Muslims (204 texts), Ahmadiyya (158 texts), and other ethnic groups (139 texts), which were also targeted during the 2024 local elections (Pilkada). Additionally, 35,999 texts containing hate speech did not target specific

individuals or groups, but included attacks against women and followers of certain belief systems.

For the LGBTQ+ group, the majority of hate speech was found on X, with 4,753 texts or 99.6% of the total content. Only 10 other texts were found on TikTok. The keywords “LGBT,” “boti,” “banci,” “jantan,” and “laki sejati” were most commonly used in the context of the DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election. The gubernatorial candidate number 01, Ridwan Kamil, was depicted as gay, and the attacks on Ridwan Kamil indirectly contributed to bullying and discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community. It is evident that the perpetrators of hate speech against the LGBTQ+ community in the DKI Jakarta election were supporters of candidates 02 and 03 (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. LGBTQ+ Hate Speech in the 2024 Jakarta Election




From the content circulating, it appears that the hate speech against LGBTQ+ in the DKI Jakarta local election was closely related to the attack on the 01 candidate Ridwan Kamil. Ridwan Kamil's statement in 2016 that he did not mind the sexual orientation of LGBTQ+ was politicized to discredit him in the 2024 local elections (Kompas.com, January 26, 2016). At that time, Ridwan was the Mayor of Bandung. His remarks had been used as a political attack in the 2018 West Java Governor Election. Word was spread that Ridwan was an LGBTQ+ supporter (CNN Indonesia, June 27, 2018).

This narrative was repeated during the 2024 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election. Keywords such as “Rido najis,” “Pro LGBT,” “FPI Dukung Cagub LGBT,” and “Kaum LGBT Rido” were included in numerous pieces of content. Ridwan Kamil responded to these accusations by stating that he had opposed LGBTQ+ behavior since 2018 (DetikNews, January 15, 2018). This, however, further increased the vulnerability of the LGBTQ+ community, as political figures aligned themselves with the masses’ demands to take an adversarial stance.

In addition to the LGBTQ+ case, attacks against the ethnic minority group, the Chinese, also stood out as a significant issue, as many of the attacks intersected with other identities, such as Christian identity, and included sexist attacks against Chinese women. In the hate speech targeting the Chinese and Christian identities, the politician from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as Ahok, was a target in many hate-filled content (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Hate Speech Against Ethnic Chinese and Christians



The data revealed two primary narratives underlying hate speech directed at the Chinese ethnic minority. The first involved attacks that revived anti-Ahok sentiment, portraying him as a symbol of both Chinese and Christian identities, due to his past conviction in a blasphemy case. This long standing animosity was reignited to discredit the Jakarta 2024 gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates who received Ahok's endorsement. The second narrative centered on negative sentiment toward the perceived influx of Chinese immigrants and Indonesians of Chinese descent, alongside accusations that the Chinese government was attempting to influence regional elections by supporting candidates backed by President Joko Widodo (2014–2024). Keywords such as “antek aseng” (“foreign puppet”) and “antek Cina komunis” (“Chinese communist stooge”) frequently appeared in content aligned with this narrative. In addition to these two main themes, some content also contained vulgar and sexist hate speech targeting Chinese women.

Although less prevalent, hate speech was also directed at other identities, including Indonesians of Yemeni descent. This narrative emerged following a statement by West Java gubernatorial candidate Dedi Mulyadi, who incited public sentiment by blaming societal divisions on urban and immigrant populations. His remarks triggered a wave of hate speech against Arab-Indonesians, who are often associated with 2024 presidential candidate Anies Baswedan.

### **3.2. Findings in Five Regions**


From the dataset focused on the regional elections (Pilkada) in five provinces, a total of 185,080 texts were collected for analysis. The findings showed that the Aceh Pilkada recorded the highest volume of hate speech content, with 8,367 texts. This was followed by West Java with 7,282 texts, West Nusa Tenggara with 2,005 texts, North Maluku with 1,577 texts, and West Sumatra with 1,549 texts.

Hate speech in these five provinces was predominantly driven by religious issues, opposition to female leadership, and a reluctance to vote for candidates who belonged to or were associated with religious minorities. Notably, religious narratives were present not only in regions where candidates belonged to different faiths, but also in contests among candidates of the same religion. The discourse was often framed around which candidate appeared more pious, suggesting that personal piety was perceived as the defining quality of a capable regional leader.

#### **3.2.1. Competing to Appear Most Islamic and Opposing Female Leadership in the Aceh Regional Elections**

Hate speech during the 2024 Aceh regional elections spiked notably on two key dates: August 26 and November 18, 2024. August 26 marked the final day of the candidate registration period, which began on August 24, 2024 (KPU RI). Meanwhile, November 18 was the day before the third gubernatorial debate in Aceh (KIP Aceh, November 19, 2024). These two events were the primary drivers of the surge in hate speech observed in the province.

Figure 6. Spike in Hate Speech in Aceh Regional Elections



In general, two dominant hate narratives emerged in the Aceh regional elections, both at the gubernatorial and mayoral levels. The first prevailing narrative involved mutual attacks among supporters of competing candidates, each vying to portray their preferred candidate as the most Islamic. Candidate pair number 01, Bustami Hamzah and Fadhil Rahmi, lost in a heated contest to pair number 02, Muzakir Manaf and Fadhlullah Dek Fadh (Metro TV News, December 8, 2024).

Table 3. Hate Speech Texts in the 2024 Aceh Governor Election

No.	Hate Speech Texts	Social Media Platform
1.	<p><i>b Aceh yg mana. Banda Aceh ikot syariat Islam masih banyak lelaki yg cakap dan pantas jadi pemimpin kota Banda Aceh. jgn sampai nanggung dosa.</i></p> <p>Which part of Aceh is being referred to? Banda Aceh follows Islamic law, and there are still many men who are capable and deserving of leading the city. Don't bear the burden of sin.</p>	TikTok (comment)
2.	<p><i>kami masyarakat Aceh tidak memilih golongan preman tp kami masyarakat Aceh pilih yg islami no 1.</i></p>	TikTok (comment)

	<p>We, the people of Aceh, did not vote for the thugs; we, the people of Aceh, voted for the one who is Islamic, namely candidate number 1.</p>	
3.	<p><i>Bustami Hamzah yang tak mampu membaca Al-Quran tak cocok untuk memimpin Aceh yang menerapkan syariat Islam #aceh #acehnews #pilkadaaceh #bustamihamzah #tidakbisa #bacaalquran</i></p> <p>Bustami Hamzah, who is unable to read the Quran, is not suitable to lead Aceh, which implements Islamic law. #aceh #acehnews #pilkadaaceh #bustamihamzah #tidakbisa #bacaalquran</p>	X
4.	<p><i>ulama bilang setiap calon pemimpin aceh harus bisa baca Qur'an tapi sekarang giliran ombusman gak bisa baca Qur'an udah bisa apa2an ini merusak citra ke Aceh bisa2 syariat Islam di hapus masyaallah.</i></p> <p>The ulama said that every prospective Aceh leader must be able to read the Qur'an, but now it's the Ombusman's turn not to be able to read the Qur'an. This damages the image of Aceh. It could be that Islamic law is abolished.</p>	TikTok (comment)
5.	<p><i>bek galak that Npegah ke muallem yg kon2 muallem emang ureng ge undang le ulama, karna gk nyan sereng sajan ulama, ken nyoe mnteng emng gk nyan nagepertahan kan syariat islam, hidup muallem 🙏🙏</i></p> <p>Don't be fierce with teachers who are truly supported by the ulama, because they are often</p>	TikTok (comment)

	with the ulama. Choose the one who truly defends Islamic law. Long live the teacher 🙌 🙌	
6.	<p><i>pilih lah yg ulama dukung jgan pilih yg mengejek ulama. yg pilih org ejek ulama ealah mereka,,yg ingin menghancur kan ajaran islama.</i></p> <p>vote for those who support the ulama, don't vote for those who mock the ulama . Those who vote for those who mock the ulama are those who want to destroy the teachings of Islam.</p>	TikTok (comment)
7.	<p><i>No 1 Jualan Ulama dan Agama... Tapi Sangat Di sayangkan dalam Bertindak Jauh Dari Nilai<sup>2</sup> Islam... Terbukti Visi Misi Tanpa Syariat Islam... Coba Di Baca</i></p> <p>No. 1 selling clerics and religion. But it is very unfortunate in acting far from Islamic values. Evidently his vision and mission without Islamic law... Give it a read</p>	TikTok (comment)
8.	<p><i>Orang pintar pasti pilih 01..Allahu Akbar.</i></p> <p>Smart people must have voted for 01.</p>	TikTok (comment)
9.	<p><i>Wish masa aceh di pimpin ga pandai nhji</i></p> <p>Don't let Aceh be led by people who are not good at reciting the Qur'an.</p>	TikTok (comment)
10.	<p><i>Anying gitu amat padahal juz 30 loh</i></p> <p>WTH how can it be so bad, even though it's juz 30.</p>	TikTok (comment)
11.	<p><i>partai ulama, mengusung kandidat tidak bisa ngaji.</i></p>	TikTok (comment)

	Clerical party endorses candidates who can't recite the Quran.	
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Bustami Hamzah served as the Acting Governor (Pj) of Aceh (Tirto, September 3, 2024), while Muzakir Manaf was a former Commander of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and had previously held the position of Vice Governor of Aceh from 2012 to 2016. During the mandatory Qur'an recitation test required by Aceh's *Qanun* (Islamic bylaw) for gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates, candidate number 01, Bustami Hamzah, was seen struggling or faltering in his recitation. This sparked widespread criticism on social media, with many claiming he was not sufficiently Islamic and therefore unfit to lead. In response, Bustami sought to strengthen his religious image by involving numerous *ulama* (Islamic clergy) in his campaign. However, this move was criticized by supporters of candidate pair 02 as a form of religious politicization, accusing him of using religious figures as political shields.

In retaliation, supporters of candidate 01 launched counter-narratives labeling supporters of candidate 02 as thugs and slanderers of religious leaders. The 2024 Aceh gubernatorial election was marked by intense contestation. On September 2, 2024, Bustami's home in Banda Aceh was targeted in a grenade attack (Detik, September 2, 2024). Numerous incidents of campaign material vandalism were also reported (AntaraNews, October 24, 2024). Historically, violence had been a recurring issue in Aceh's regional elections. Bawaslu recorded 11 cases of physical violence during the 2006 Pilkada, 91 cases in 2009, 57 in 2012, and 26 in 2017 (Rumah Pemilu, February 11, 2017).

The second dominant narrative identified in the monitoring of hate speech in Aceh was directed at female candidates. Illiza Sa'aduddin Djamal, candidate number 01 for Mayor of Banda Aceh (Detik, October 31, 2024) was subjected to religion-based hate speech throughout her 2024 candidacy—even though she had previously served as Deputy Mayor of Banda Aceh from 2007 to 2014, and as Mayor from 2014 to 2017 (Tribunnews, October 18, 2024). The hate speech against her centered on

the narrative that it was religiously forbidden (*haram*) for women to lead, framing her candidacy as illegitimate under Islamic law. This was often accompanied by calls urging the public not to vote for her solely on the basis of her gender.

*Table 4. Hate Speech against Woman Candidate in the Banda Aceh Municipal Election*

No.	Hate Speech Texts	Social Media Platform
1.	<i>Pencalonan Illiza Sah menurut Qanun Pilkada Aceh, namun tidak Sah menurut Syariat Islam</i>  Illiza's candidacy is legal according to Aceh's Pilkada Qanun, but not according to Sharia Law	TikTok (comment)
2.	<i>Dalam Islam Hareum Urung Inong Jeut keu pemimpin</i> <i>(Dalam Islam haram perempuan menjadi pemimpin)</i>  In Islam it is forbidden for women to be leaders.	TikTok (comment)
3.	<i>barti hanjeut tapileh keu pemimpin ureng Inong</i> <i>(Berarti kita tidak bisa memilih pemimpin perempuan)</i>  That means we can't elect a female leader.	TikTok (comment)
4.	<i>(pencalonan perempuan) nyan jak lawan Hukum Allah..</i> <i>(itu bertentangan dengan hukum Tuhan)</i>  It is against God's law.	TikTok (comment)
5.	<i>y ALLAH jaga lah hamba jangan sempat melanggar hukum mu dg memilih perempuan sebagai pemimpin terima genaseh Tgk sehat selalu Tgk</i>	TikTok (comment)

	Ya ALLAH keep me from breaking your law by electing woman as a leader. Thank you Tengku, I wish you good health, Tengku.	
6.	<p><i>lon ureng Inong tapi han ek lon pileh ureng inong karna pemimpin adalh lelaki jadi ureng inong tau diri pat posisi getanyo sbagai perempuan.</i></p> <p><i>(Saya seorang perempuan, tapi saya tidak memilih perempuan karena pemimpin adalah laki-laki, jadi perempuan tahu di mana posisi kita sebagai perempuan.)</i></p> <p>I am a woman, but I don't vote for women because leaders are men. So, women know where we stand as women.</p>	TikTok (comment)
7.	<p><i>mnyeu Nyan npeugah abu mudi Nyan ka kbeutoi,Nyan hukum Islam MMG hnjeut pemimpin urg Inong,maka NABI hna dari kaom hawa.</i></p> <p><i>(Kalau itu yang dikatakan abu muda itu benar, itu hukum Islam memang tidak bisa menjadi pemimpin wanita, maka Nabi bukan dari kaum Hawa.)</i></p> <p>If that is what young abu said, then it is true. Islamic law does not allow women to be leaders. Therefore, the prophet was not a woman.</p>	TikTok (comment)
8.	<p>Dalam kitap pemimp tetap laki laki</p> <p>In the scriptures, the leader remains male.</p>	TikTok (comment)

Ironically, the attacks against the female candidate were exacerbated by statements from religious leaders who undermined the legitimacy of women in leadership roles. A prominent Acehese cleric, Tgk H. Syaikh

Hasanoel Bashry, also known as Abu Mudi, publicly urged Illiza to withdraw from the mayoral race in Banda Aceh. He argued that her candidacy was contrary to the natural disposition of women as prescribed in the Qur'an and Hadith. According to Abu Mudi, Illiza had committed a sin by aspiring to become a leader, and this sin would also befall the women who voted for her, as well as those who endorsed her candidacy. His views were echoed by Saiful Mulki, Chair of the United Aceh Forum (Forum Aceh Bersatu/FAB), and were subsequently amplified by local Acehnese media outlets and widely disseminated on social media platforms. Illiza was the sole female candidate among the four mayoral hopefuls competing in the 2024 Banda Aceh local election (RRI, 30 September 2024). Figure 7 illustrates one example of hate speech narratives targeting woman candidate, which, as our monitoring revealed, were not only amplified on platforms such as X and TikTok, but also circulated widely on other platforms including Instagram and various local media outlets.

Figure 7. Hate Speech Against Banda Aceh's Woman Candidate on Instagram




### 3.2.2. The Impact of the Presidential Election in West Sumatra Local Elections

In the West Sumatra regional election (Pilkada), a surge in hate speech was observed during the #KawalPutusanMK demonstration on August 26, 2024, and throughout the campaign period on November 11, 2024. The

dominant forms of hate speech in the province primarily targeted national political figures, particularly presidential and vice-presidential candidates competing in the local elections, along with their supporting political parties. Additionally, there was a strong narrative opposing regional head candidates affiliated with political dynasties or backed by major party coalitions from the 2024 presidential election. In contrast, hate speech targeting minority groups was found to be minimal and statistically insignificant during this observation period.


*Figure 8. Spike in Hate Speech in West Sumatera Regional Elections*



### 3.2.3. Labeling of Indigenous Beliefs as Deviant and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the West Java Local Elections


In the West Java regional elections, the final day of candidate registration on August 26, 2024, triggered a significant spike in hate speech. A total of 19,322 instances of hate speech were recorded across the platforms X (formerly Twitter) and TikTok (see Figure 9). A similar surge in hate speech during this stage of the electoral process was also observed in the 2024 Aceh regional election.

*Figure 9. Spike in Hate Speech in West Java Regional Elections*



In the West Java gubernatorial election, two dominant issues emerged in relation to hate speech. The first issue targeted candidate number 04, Dedi Mulyadi, and indirectly attacked followers of indigenous belief systems, such as Sunda Wiwitan. Dedi Mulyadi, known for his advocacy of preserving Sundanese customs and cultural heritage (Kompas.com, 18 November 2024), was portrayed in hate narratives as deviant, infidel, and polytheistic—accusations that implied he was committing *shirk* or associating partners with the One Almighty God (see Figure 10).

Figure 10. Hate Speech Attacks Indigenous Beliefs in West Java Gubernatorial Election



In the hate speech content identified, the label of "deviant" directed at individuals practicing indigenous belief systems was often expressed through insults and derogatory language targeting Dedi Mulyadi. The narratives revealed a clear lack of public understanding regarding these belief systems. Sunda Wiwitan, for example, is a syncretic religion combining elements of Islam, Hinduism, and ancestral beliefs, with a strong emphasis on environmental preservation (Wahid, 2011). Nevertheless, adherents of such belief systems are often stigmatized as deviant, infidel, and polytheistic.

In addition to hate speech targeting religious minorities, another prominent issue circulating on social media concerned anti-immigrant sentiment. This discourse emerged following the second gubernatorial debate in West Java on November 16, 2024 (Metro TV, 16 November 2024). During the event, Dedi Mulyadi stated that urban populations and migrants were two sources of intolerance in West Java. His remarks were subsequently politicized and used to legitimize attacks on Indonesians of mixed ethnic heritage.

“@tekarok007 mantaaab Kang Dedi Mulyadi, jangan maw dibodoh2hi kaum urban dan imigran yaman”

*@tekarok007 Great Kang Dedi Mulyadi! Don't want to be fooled by urbanites and Yemeni immigrants.*

“Rakyat Indonesia itu toleran, sumber kegaduhan ini: migran (Yaman dan cina ) dan kaum urban. Quote : Dedi mulyasi (dg catatan)”

*The people of Indonesian are tolerant, the source of this uproar: migrants (Yemenis and Chinese) and urbanites. Quote: Dedi mulyasi (with note)*

“BAPA AING LERES PISAN ! itulah kenapa Donald Trump mengeluarkan kebijakan imigran karena sadar bahaya mereka. Makin mantap dukung Dedi Mulyadi karena selaras dengan @realDonaldTrump, inilah yang dibutuhkan Jabar ! @DediMulyadi71 #DebatPilgubJabar #TimnasDay”

*My man is really cool! That's why Donald Trump issued the immigrant policy because he realized their danger. More confident to support Dedi Mulyadi because he is in line with @realDonaldTrump. This is what West Java needs. @DediMulyadi71 #DebatPilgubJabar #TimnasDay”*


Dedi Mulyadi did not explicitly mention any specific immigrant groups during the campaign debate. However, those responsible for spreading hate speech inserted references to particular ethnic communities, specifically Indonesians of Yemeni Arab and Chinese descent. These narratives sought to shape public opinion by framing immigrants as the root cause of social unrest and problems in Indonesia. Within the broader context of hate speech, these narratives also drew parallels with global issues—particularly the anti-immigrant stance of former U.S. President

Donald Trump, who was known for targeting immigrants from China and the Middle East.

### 3.2.4. Anti-Women Sentiment Toward Female Gubernatorial Candidates in the West Nusa Tenggara Local Elections

Hate speech in West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) increased significantly during the election campaign period. The second candidate debate on November 8 and the lead-up to the third debate on November 19 triggered a surge in hate speech, targeting both candidate pairs in general and specifically female candidates.

Figure 11. Spike in Hate Speech in NTB Regional Elections



Similar to the Banda Aceh mayoral election where female candidate faced discrimination and demonization, the female gubernatorial candidate in the West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) election also experienced political violence in the form of hate speech. The hate narratives were likewise rooted in religious justification, claiming that women are prohibited from becoming leaders according to the Qur'an and Hadith, and that female leadership would lead to societal ruin.

Table 5. Hate Speech against Woman Candidate in NTB Gubernatorial Election

No.	Hate Speech Texts	Social Media Platform
1.	<p><i>ndk boleh jg perempuan memipin ormas keislaman di NU, Muhammadiyah jg ndk di kasih</i></p> <p>It is also not permissible for women to lead Islamic organizations in NU, Muhammadiyah is not allowed either.</p>	TikTok (comment)
2.	<p><i>Denarkan kata TGB dan Ustad Abdul Somad...Hadist Rasulullah, Nggak akan menang suatu kaum yang dipimpin oleh perempuan.</i></p> <p>Listen to the words of TGB and Ustad Abdul Somad. The Prophet's hadith says that a nation led by women will not prosper.</p>	TikTok (comment)
3.	<p><i>masak menjadikan perempuan jadi pemimpin, katanya tidak boleh</i></p> <p>Why do you want to make women leaders? He said it's not allowed</p>	TikTok (comment)
4.	<p><i>ada pengecualian ya pandangan madzhab beliau bahwa memilih pemimpin jangan yg perempuan.</i></p> <p>There is an exception to his madzhab view that choosing a leader should not be a woman</p>	TikTok (comment)
5.	<p><i>Setelah beberapa kali mendengar statement TGB tentang kepemimpinan perempuan, rasa rasanya NTB memang hanya butuh pemimpin laki-laki bukan perempuan. Sebaiknya Bu Rohmi akan lebih baik kembali mendampingi Zul aja di Pilkada NTB tahun ini, sebelum terlambat Bu</i></p>	TikTok (comment)

	<p><i>bentar lagi pendaftaran loh. #ntb #zulrohmi</i></p> <p>After hearing TGB's statement about women's leadership several times, it feels like NTB only needs male leaders, not women. It is better for Ms. Rohmi to return to accompany Zul in the NTB elections this year before it is too late. It's almost time for registration. #ntb #zulrohmi</p>	
6.	<p><i>krna tgb mengharamkan perempuan jadi pemimpin sejak dulu</i></p> <p>Because TGB forbade women from becoming leaders in the first place</p>	TikTok (comment)
7.	<p><i>amit amit di pimpin perempuan</i></p> <p>Don't let it be led by women.</p>	TikTok (comment)

An interesting aspect of the NTB gubernatorial election which set it apart from the case in Aceh was the presence of a prominent cleric who defended women's leadership. TGB Muhammad Zainul Majdi, founder of *Nahdlatul Wathan* and Governor of NTB from 2008 to 2018, stated that women with the necessary capacity and capability were worthy of leadership roles. He also highlighted the existence of egalitarian and women-friendly interpretations of religious texts (YouTube BKN PDI Perjuangan, 21 April 2022). Nevertheless, the NTB election period was still marked by distortions and sarcastic narratives that discredited and demeaned the female candidate. Notably, the female gubernatorial candidate in NTB 2024, Sitti Rohmi Djalilah—candidate number 01—was the sister of TGB Muhammad Zainul Majdi (Kompas, 19 September 2018).


Sitti Rohmi was the sole female gubernatorial candidate in the 2024 West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) gubernatorial election. Previously, she had served as Vice Governor of NTB for the 2018–2023 term alongside Zulkieflimansyah, the incumbent and candidate number 02 (Liputan6, 25 November 2024). While other female vice-gubernatorial candidates were in the race, the attacks were primarily directed at Sitti Rohmi, who contested the top

executive position against two male gubernatorial candidates. In the final results, Sitti Rohmi received the fewest votes, securing 27.45 percent of the total (Detik, 6 December 2024).

### 3.2.5. Sentiment Toward Christian and Female Leadership in the North Maluku Regional Elections

Hate speech in the 2024 North Maluku regional elections began to intensify on October 7 and peaked on October 21, 2024. On October 12, 2024, gubernatorial candidate number 04, Benny Laos, tragically died in a speedboat accident (Tempo, 30 November 2024). Following the incident, the process of selecting a replacement candidate was initiated, and the decision to nominate Sherly Tjoanda, Benny Laos's wife, was officially announced on October 21, 2024 (Tempo, 21 October 2024).

Figure 12. Spike in Hate Speech in North Maluku Regional Elections



Following her official nomination as gubernatorial candidate, Sherly Tjoanda became the target of gender and religion based hate speech. Sherly was also of Chinese descent (Suara, 29 November 2024). However, her Chinese identity did not become a focal point of the hate narratives.


Table 6. Hate Speech Text in the 2024 North Maluku gubernatorial election

Hate Speech Texts	Identity Attacked	Social Media Platform
<p><i>Biarkan dg segala cara di gunakan tapi dlm sejarah moluku kie raha tdk ada perempuan nasrani pimpinan dinegeri jajiratul mulk, negeri para raja atau Sultan. camkan tu para pendukung nomor 4.</i></p> <p>Let all means be used, but in the history of Maluku, no Christian woman has become a leader in the land of kings or sultans. Keep that in mind, supporters of number 4.</p>	Perempuan dan Kristen.	TikTok (comment)
<p><i>Maafya, kami masyarakat Maluku utara tdk mau pemimpin Wanita. Di Maluku Utara moyiritas beragama Islam.</i></p> <p>Sorry, we North Maluku people don't want a woman leader. In North Maluku, the majority are Muslims.</p>	Perempuan dan Kristen	TikTok (comment)
<p><i>Maaf torang Islam pilih orang Islam sesuai perintah Al Quran</i></p> <p>Sorry, Muslims vote for Muslims according to the Quranic commandment.</p>	Kristen	TikTok (comment)
<p><i>kami memilih, sesuai petunjuk Al-Qur'an.. dan pemimpin harus kaum lelaki</i></p> <p>We vote according to Qur'anic guidance, and the leader must be a man.</p>	Perempuan	TikTok (comment)
<p><i>pilihlah pemimpin sesuai petunjuk Qur'an dan Sunnah Rasulullah, ini Malut adalah daerah kerajaan Islam, hanya org fasik sj yg</i></p>	Kristen	TikTok (comment)

<p><i>pilih Non, ini Rasulullah yg bilang</i></p> <p>Choose leaders according to the instructions of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. North Maluku is an Islamic kingdom area. Only wicked people choose non-Muslims. This is what the Prophet said.</p>		
<p><i>cantik doang tra bisa kerja ujungnya jadi tumbal oligarki demi kapling konsesi</i></p> <p>Being beautiful doesn't guarantee you can work. you end up being a sacrifice for the oligarchy for the sake of concession lots</p>	Perempuan	TikTok (comment)
<p><i>AWASS...ITU MODUS OBET DAN KRISTENISASI</i></p> <p>WATCH OUT! IT'S A MODE OF CHRISTIANIZATION!</p>	Kristen	TikTok (comment)
<p><i>maaf ibu ini islam atau apa..mo kse tunjuk apa..islam itu ada dpe ajaran..klo mo pake bgni ibu harusnya ada yg tegur</i></p> <p>Sorry, is she a Muslim or what? What does she want to show? Islam has its teachings. If she wants to wear a headscarf like this, someone should reprimand her.</p>	Kristen	TikTok (comment)
<p><i>Yg penting jgn pili janda</i></p> <p>The important thing is not to vote for a widow.</p>	Perempuan	TikTok (comment)
<p><i>Qta suka ibu serli, tpi maaf klu pemimpin qta cari seagama,,</i></p> <p>We like Mrs.Serli, but sorry we're looking for a leader with the same religion.</p>	Kristen	TikTok (comment)

The circulated texts revealed a strong undercurrent of anti-Christian sentiment in the North Maluku regional election. Sherly Tjoanda was portrayed as a missionary figure who would promote Christianization in the region (see Figure 12). Messages also circulated in the form of admonitions directed at Muslim voters who supported a Christian gubernatorial candidate. Additionally, much of the hate speech carried sexist overtones. Keywords such as “cagub cantik”, “coblos yang cantik”, and “pilih yang cantik” appeared frequently in TikTok comments.

Figure 13. Anti-Christian Narratives in the 2024 North Maluku Gubernatorial Election



In response to the hate speech, Sherly Tjoanda’s supporters actively countered such narratives in the comment sections. Their defense emphasized several key points: Sherly’s leadership capabilities, her reputation as a kind-hearted individual believed to lead North Maluku with sincerity, the importance of interfaith tolerance, and the argument that a candidate’s religion should not be a factor in determining their electability. The coordinated pattern of these counter-narratives suggested that her campaign team was well-prepared to confront hate speech targeting her as a female, Chinese-Indonesian, and Christian gubernatorial candidate.

# **Chapter 4.**

# **Conclusion**

## Chapter 4. Conclusion

### 4.1. Discussion

Using both quantitative and qualitative approaches, this report captures three key aspects. *First*, the volume of hate speech targeting vulnerable groups during the 2024 Regional Elections, along with its distribution across social media platforms. *Second*, the specific issues used to deliver hate speech. *Third*, the dominant narratives that frame hate messages against vulnerable groups within the context of local executive elections. These three findings serve as evidence that digital spaces remain unsafe for vulnerable communities—particularly during political moments—despite existing community guidelines and platform commitments to responsive content moderation aimed at protecting human rights. The accompanying codebook and database of hate speech texts collected may also serve as a valuable resource for future monitoring efforts.

Despite the documentation undertaken, we acknowledge several limitations in this monitoring effort. First, not all election-related content from the five regions could be collected. The greatest challenge stemmed from our limited understanding of local languages; as a result, the majority of analyzed texts were in Bahasa Indonesia. Second, the monitoring did not yet succeed in mapping the narratives found in audiovisual content. In the future, to further contribute to addressing hate speech against vulnerable groups, research focused on these issues is essential:

1. The role of political actors and media—both traditional and alternative—in either amplifying or countering hate speech directed at vulnerable groups;
2. The long-term psychological, social, and political impacts on communities targeted by hate speech, including reduced or fearful political participation and mental health consequences;
3. The impact of exposure to hate speech on voter behavior, both among members of vulnerable communities and the broader electorate; and

4. The effectiveness of anti-hate speech legislation and content moderation mechanisms in preventing discrimination during elections in Indonesia.

## **4.2. Recommendations**

Monitoring of hate speech during the 2024 Regional Elections reveals that vulnerable groups—such as LGBTQ+ individuals, women, religious or belief minorities, and people of Chinese descent—continued to be targeted. While many attacks were directed at political actors involved in the elections, including candidates and campaign teams, these assaults also indirectly harmed vulnerable groups, as the hate speech leveraged existing prejudices against them. To foster a more democratic digital space for vulnerable communities—particularly during political moments when everyone should be able to participate freely and safely—we offer several recommendations to policymakers and relevant stakeholders.

### **4.2.1. Recommendations to Government**

1. Promote digital literacy programs for the public to enable individuals to recognize and respond to hate speech wisely. However, such digital literacy initiatives must emphasize human rights principles—such as respect for others, the right to be free from discrimination, and the right to feel safe—rather than focusing solely on the legal consequences of hate speech.
2. Integrate anti-hate speech education into school curricula, emphasizing tolerance, human rights principles, critical thinking, and responsible online behavior.
3. Provide support services for victims, including legal assistance, counseling, and protection mechanisms.
4. Support grassroots initiatives that promote dialogue and conflict resolution within affected communities.
5. Encourage social media platforms to increase transparency around the algorithms they use, particularly those that may influence the spread of hate speech and incitement to violence.

#### 4.2.2. Recommendations to Social Media Platforms

1. Conduct regular mapping and identification of hate speech targeting vulnerable groups. Updating this mapping is crucial, as keywords and targets of hate speech evolve over time, often influenced by specific events. For example, during the 2024 West Java Gubernatorial Election, adherents of traditional belief systems became targets of hate speech due to political agendas aimed at discrediting a particular candidate who practiced certain cultural traditions. Such mapping can serve as an early warning system for monitoring the spread of online hate speech across various platforms.
2. Establish stronger collaboration with experts, communities frequently targeted by hate speech, and human rights advocacy organizations in efforts to monitor hate speech with potentially serious and sustained impacts. For instance, the hate speech experienced by Rohingya refugees has significantly compromised their safety and future prospects.
3. Conduct audits of policies and the impact of algorithms on the dissemination of hate speech. Such audits would provide an in-depth analysis of recommendation algorithms that may inadvertently amplify hate speech by clustering users based on shared interests and then promoting similar types of content to all users—creating echo chambers and filter bubble effects. Once key areas for addressing hate speech are identified, social media companies can adjust their recommendation systems to prevent directing users toward harmful content.
4. Establish clear, easily accessible, and rapid reporting mechanisms for users to flag hate speech, and ensure that users receive timely notifications regarding the follow-up of their reports.
5. Proactively utilize fact-checking databases maintained by independent fact-checkers such as *cekfakta.com* to monitor and address false information containing hate speech. Indonesia's fact-checking ecosystem is now significantly more robust than during the 2019 elections. This progress represents a valuable asset that can benefit social media companies in combating harmful content.
6. Collaborate with other social media companies to combat the spread of hate speech and disinformation across platforms. The growing

popularity of short-form videos has led to widespread content circulation on multiple platforms, making a siloed, platform-specific approach to content moderation less effective.

7. Promote credible accounts or channels that provide accurate information and offer public education, such as independent media outlets, fact-checking organizations, or human rights and democracy-focused organizations. This approach can present alternative narratives, enabling users to access more comprehensive and reliable information. To date, credible organizations working in fact-checking or journalism often struggle to gain high engagement, as they compete with celebrity or influencer channels whose content is rarely subject to rigorous verification and, in some cases, promotes hate.
8. Enforce community standards more proactively, particularly in addressing cyber armies that operate fake or troll accounts, and create groups or pages to disseminate hate speech and disinformation targeting vulnerable communities.
9. Develop transparent content moderation policies that strike a balance between protecting freedom of expression and removing harmful content.
10. Provide free access to APIs to allow experts, researchers, and journalists to monitor and investigate trends, narratives, and actors involved in spreading hate speech on social media platforms.

#### **4.2.3. Recommendations to Election Management Bodies**

1. Integrate the issue of hate speech into civic and electoral education materials for citizens. A holistic approach to education on democracy and human rights can equip voters with the tools to recognize and counter intolerance in everyday life. Long-term political education is also believed to reduce the vulnerability of marginalized groups to hate speech and incitement to violence.
2. Develop internal and external communication guidelines that promote equality and non-discrimination.
3. For the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu), ensure the effective handling of complaints related to hate speech and discrimination cases.

4. Establish multi-stakeholder collaboration involving all relevant actors—including civil society organizations, experts, and social media companies—to mitigate and address hate speech that adversely affects vulnerable communities throughout the electoral process.
5. Monitor, collect, and report data on hate speech targeting vulnerable groups. Bawaslu can develop its own monitoring tools or collaborate with civil society organizations that have the capacity to monitor social media, focusing specifically on hate speech that discriminates, incites violence, reinforces stigma, or endangers lives. The results of such monitoring should be disseminated transparently to help the public understand trends in hate speech, the social media platforms most commonly used for its spread, and the vulnerable groups most frequently targeted.
6. Strengthen the capacity of regional election monitors to track hate speech on social media. Training programs should incorporate human rights-related themes such as the right to vote, non-discrimination, gender equality, protected and prohibited speech, the scope of hate speech and incitement, as well as relevant national laws and international legal instruments.

#### **4.2.4. Recommendations to Media and Journalists**

1. Regularly monitor hate speech on social media, particularly during elections and local political contests. Monitoring can be carried out independently or in collaboration with universities, experts, or civil society organizations focused on combating hate speech. Findings from such monitoring can assist the media in identifying emerging trends early.
2. Develop internal guidelines that support diversity in newsrooms and media coverage. These guidelines should include policies for recruiting staff from minority groups, producing journalistic content that counters hate speech against vulnerable populations, and using inclusive and non-discriminatory language. Media outlets must also refrain from amplifying hate speech expressed by politicians, candidates, or particular groups that could incite hatred and violence against others.

3. Strengthen the culture of fact-checking in all reporting by verifying claims made by politicians, candidates, and their campaign teams—especially statements that contain hate speech against individuals or vulnerable groups—to ensure the accuracy of information received by the public.

#### 4.2.5. Recommendations to Civil Society and Communities

1. Conduct anti-stereotype and anti-discrimination campaigns by building narratives that emphasize diversity, the importance of empathy, and tolerance.
2. Engage in multi-stakeholder collaboration to prevent and respond to hate speech targeting vulnerable groups.
3. Provide human rights-based digital literacy education to the public.
4. Educate the public on how to report hate speech on social media to both platform providers and relevant authorities.
5. Collaborate with legal institutions to support victims of hate speech.
6. Actively participate in monitoring and reporting hate speech.
7. Advocate for transparency from social media platforms regarding data on the spread of hate speech, and for their accountability concerning the algorithms used, which may contribute to the dissemination of harmful content and incitement to violence.

Effectively combating hate speech requires an approach that balances the need to protect vulnerable groups with respect for freedom of expression. By enhancing digital accountability, promoting human rights-based literacy, and fostering multi-stakeholder collaboration, stakeholders can come together to create a safer, more democratic, and inclusive space for all citizens. Furthermore, the ability to adapt sustainably to emerging challenges is critical in ensuring the long-term effectiveness of hate speech mitigation efforts.

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## Appendix

### Appendix A

**B**elow are the keywords for each province, along with the keywords used to collect texts targeting vulnerable groups.

Jenis	Keywords
<b>Aceh</b>	bustami OR (tgk AND muhammad AND yusuf AND a AND wahab) OR (tu AND sop) OR (muzakir AND manaf) OR mualem OR fadhilullah OR (dek AND fad) OR "illiza sa'aduddin djamal" OR (afdhal AND khalilullah) OR (zainal AND arifin) OR (mulia AND rahman) OR (aminullah AND usman) OR (isnaini AND husda) OR (teuku AND irwan AND djohan) OR (khairul AND amal) OR (kpu AND aceh) OR (kpu AND banda AND aceh) OR (kpu AND subulussalam) OR (pemilu AND aceh) OR (pemilu AND banda AND aceh) OR (pemilu AND subulussalam) OR (cagub AND aceh) OR (cagub AND banda AND aceh) OR (cagub AND subulussalam) OR (cabup AND aceh) OR (cabup AND banda AND aceh) OR (cabup AND subulussalam) OR (cawagub AND aceh) OR (cawagub AND banda AND aceh) OR (cawagub AND subulussalam) OR (cawalkot AND aceh) OR (cawalkot AND banda AND aceh) OR (cawalkot AND subulussalam) OR (calon AND walikota AND aceh) OR (calon AND walikota AND banda AND aceh) OR (calon AND walikota AND subulussalam) OR (kampanye AND aceh) OR (kampanye AND banda AND aceh) OR (kampanye AND subulussalam) OR (kandidat AND aceh) OR (kandidat AND banda AND aceh) OR (kandidat AND subulussalam) OR (bawaslu AND aceh) OR (bawaslu AND banda AND aceh) OR (bawaslu AND subulussalam) OR (calon AND

	<p>gubernur AND aceh) OR (calon AND gubernur AND banda AND aceh) OR (calon AND gubernur AND subulussalam) OR (pilkada AND aceh) OR (pilkada AND banda AND aceh) OR (pilkada AND subulussalam) OR (kip AND aceh) OR (kip AND banda AND aceh) OR (kip AND subulussalam) OR (GAM AND aceh) OR (GAM AND banda AND aceh) OR (GAM AND subulussalam) OR (panwaslih AND aceh) OR (panwaslih AND banda AND aceh) OR (panwaslih AND subulussalam)</p>
<p><b>Nort Maluku</b></p>	<p>(muhammad AND kasuba) OR (basri AND salama) OR asrul OR (santrani AND abusama) OR (bustamin AND abdulatif) OR "santrani-bustamin" OR (erwin AND umar) OR (zulkifli AND umar) OR (benny AND laos) OR (sarbin AND sahe) OR (ahmad AND hidayat AND mus) OR (aliong AND mus) OR (sahril AND thahir) OR (relawan AND bravo24) OR (kpu AND malut) OR (kpu AND maluku AND utara) OR (kpu AND sofifi) OR (kpu AND halmahera) OR (kpu AND ternate) OR (kpu AND morotai) OR (kpu AND tidore) OR (kpu AND tobelo) OR (kpu AND labuha) OR (pemilu AND malut) OR (pemilu AND maluku AND utara) OR (pemilu AND sofifi) OR (pemilu AND halmahera) OR (pemilu AND ternate) OR (pemilu AND morotai) OR (pemilu AND tidore) OR (pemilu AND tobelo) OR (pemilu AND labuha) OR (cagub AND malut) OR (cagub AND maluku AND utara) OR (cagub AND sofifi) OR (cagub AND halmahera) OR (cagub AND ternate) OR (cagub AND morotai) OR (cagub AND tidore) OR (cagub AND tobelo) OR (cagub AND labuha) OR (cabup AND malut) OR (cabup AND maluku AND utara) OR (cabup AND sofifi) OR (cabup AND halmahera) OR (cabup AND ternate) OR (cabup AND morotai) OR (cabup AND tidore) OR (cabup AND tobelo) OR (cabup AND</p>

labuha) OR (cawagub AND malut) OR (cawagub AND maluku AND utara) OR (cawagub AND sofifi) OR (cawagub AND halmahera) OR (cawagub AND ternate) OR (cawagub AND morotai) OR (cawagub AND tidore) OR (cawagub AND tobelo) OR (cawagub AND labuha) OR (cawalkot AND malut) OR (cawalkot AND maluku AND utara) OR (cawalkot AND sofifi) OR (cawalkot AND halmahera) OR (cawalkot AND ternate) OR (cawalkot AND morotai) OR (cawalkot AND tidore) OR (cawalkot AND tobelo) OR (cawalkot AND labuha) OR (calon AND walikota AND malut) OR (calon AND walikota AND maluku AND utara) OR (calon AND walikota AND sofifi) OR (calon AND walikota AND halmahera) OR (calon AND walikota AND ternate) OR (calon AND walikota AND morotai) OR (calon AND walikota AND tidore) OR (calon AND walikota AND tobelo) OR (calon AND walikota AND labuha) OR (kampanye AND malut) OR (kampanye AND maluku AND utara) OR (kampanye AND sofifi) OR (kampanye AND halmahera) OR (kampanye AND ternate) OR (kampanye AND morotai) OR (kampanye AND tidore) OR (kampanye AND tobelo) OR (kampanye AND labuha) OR (kandidat AND malut) OR (kandidat AND maluku AND utara) OR (kandidat AND sofifi) OR (kandidat AND halmahera) OR (kandidat AND ternate) OR (kandidat AND morotai) OR (kandidat AND tidore) OR (kandidat AND tobelo) OR (kandidat AND labuha) OR (bawaslu AND malut) OR (bawaslu AND maluku AND utara) OR (bawaslu AND sofifi) OR (bawaslu AND halmahera) OR (bawaslu AND ternate) OR (bawaslu AND morotai) OR (bawaslu AND tidore) OR (bawaslu AND tobelo) OR (bawaslu AND labuha) OR (calon AND gubernur AND malut) OR (calon AND gubernur AND maluku AND utara) OR (calon AND gubernur AND sofifi) OR (calon AND gubernur AND halmahera) OR (calon

	<p>AND gubernur AND ternate) OR (calon AND gubernur AND morotai) OR (calon AND gubernur AND tidore) OR (calon AND gubernur AND tobelo) OR (calon AND gubernur AND labuha) OR (pilkada AND malut) OR (pilkada AND maluku AND utara) OR (pilkada AND sofifi) OR (pilkada AND halmahera) OR (pilkada AND ternate) OR (pilkada AND morotai) OR (pilkada AND tidore) OR (pilkada AND tobelo) OR (pilkada AND labuha)</p>
<p><b>West Java</b></p>	<p>(dedi AND mulyadi) OR (erwan AND setiawan) OR "dedi-erwan" OR "syaikhu-ilham" OR (ahmad AND syaikhu) OR (ilham AND akbar AND habibie) OR (acep AND adang AND ruhiat) OR (acep AND adang AND ruhiyat) OR (gitalis AND dwi AND natarina) OR "acep-gita" OR "jeje-ronal" OR (jeje AND wiradinata) OR (ronal AND surapradja) OR (haru AND suandharu) OR (ridwan AND dhani AND wirianata) OR (arfi AND rafnialdi) OR (yena AND iskandar AND masoem) OR (muhammad AND farhan) OR (h. AND erwin) OR (dandan AND riza AND wardana) OR (arif AND wijaya) OR (kpu AND jabar) OR (kpu AND bandung) OR (kpu AND jawa AND barat) OR (kpu AND garut) OR (pemilu AND jabar) OR (pemilu AND bandung) OR (pemilu AND jawa AND barat) OR (pemilu AND garut) OR (cagub AND jabar) OR (cagub AND bandung) OR (cagub AND jawa AND barat) OR (cagub AND garut) OR (cabup AND jabar) OR (cabup AND bandung) OR (cabup AND jawa AND barat) OR (cabup AND garut) OR (cawagub AND jabar) OR (cawagub AND bandung) OR (cawagub AND jawa AND barat) OR (cawagub AND garut) OR (cawalkot AND jabar) OR (cawalkot AND bandung) OR (cawalkot AND jawa AND barat) OR (cawalkot AND garut) OR (calon AND walikota AND jabar) OR (calon AND walikota AND bandung) OR (calon AND</p>

	<p>walikota AND jawa AND barat) OR (calon AND walikota AND garut) OR (kampanye AND jabar) OR (kampanye AND bandung) OR (kampanye AND jawa AND barat) OR (kampanye AND garut) OR (kandidat AND jabar) OR (kandidat AND bandung) OR (kandidat AND jawa AND barat) OR (kandidat AND garut) OR (bawaslu AND jabar) OR (bawaslu AND bandung) OR (bawaslu AND jawa AND barat) OR (bawaslu AND garut) OR (calon AND gubernur AND jabar) OR (calon AND gubernur AND bandung) OR (calon AND gubernur AND jawa AND barat) OR (calon AND gubernur AND garut) OR (pilkada AND jabar) OR (pilkada AND bandung) OR (pilkada AND jawa AND barat) OR (pilkada AND garut)</p>
<p><b>West Nusa Tenggara</b></p>	<p>zulkieflimansyah OR suhaili OR "zul-uhel" OR (sitti AND rohmi AND djalillah) OR musyafirin OR "rohmi-firin" OR (lalu AND muhamad AND iqbal) OR (indah AND dhamayanti AND putri) OR "iqbal-dinda" OR (kpu AND ntb) OR (kpu AND lombok) OR (kpu AND mataram) OR (kpu AND sumbawa) OR (kpu AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (kpu AND bima) OR (kpu AND dompu) OR (kpu AND taliwang) OR (kpu AND selong) OR (pemilu AND ntb) OR (pemilu AND lombok) OR (pemilu AND mataram) OR (pemilu AND sumbawa) OR (pemilu AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (pemilu AND bima) OR (pemilu AND dompu) OR (pemilu AND taliwang) OR (pemilu AND selong) OR (cagub AND ntb) OR (cagub AND lombok) OR (cagub AND mataram) OR (cagub AND sumbawa) OR (cagub AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (cagub AND bima) OR (cagub AND dompu) OR (cagub AND taliwang) OR (cagub AND selong) OR (cabup AND ntb) OR (cabup AND lombok) OR (cabup AND mataram) OR (cabup AND sumbawa) OR (cabup AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (cabup AND</p>

bima) OR (cabup AND dompu) OR (cabup AND taliwang) OR (cabup AND selong) OR (cawagub AND ntb) OR (cawagub AND lombok) OR (cawagub AND mataram) OR (cawagub AND sumbawa) OR (cawagub AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (cawagub AND bima) OR (cawagub AND dompu) OR (cawagub AND taliwang) OR (cawagub AND selong) OR (cawalkot AND ntb) OR (cawalkot AND lombok) OR (cawalkot AND mataram) OR (cawalkot AND sumbawa) OR (cawalkot AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (cawalkot AND bima) OR (cawalkot AND dompu) OR (cawalkot AND taliwang) OR (cawalkot AND selong) OR (calon AND walikota AND ntb) OR (calon AND walikota AND lombok) OR (calon AND walikota AND mataram) OR (calon AND walikota AND sumbawa) OR (calon AND walikota AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (calon AND walikota AND bima) OR (calon AND walikota AND dompu) OR (calon AND walikota AND taliwang) OR (calon AND walikota AND selong) OR (kampanye AND ntb) OR (kampanye AND lombok) OR (kampanye AND mataram) OR (kampanye AND sumbawa) OR (kampanye AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (kampanye AND bima) OR (kampanye AND dompu) OR (kampanye AND taliwang) OR (kampanye AND selong) OR (kandidat AND ntb) OR (kandidat AND lombok) OR (kandidat AND mataram) OR (kandidat AND sumbawa) OR (kandidat AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (kandidat AND bima) OR (kandidat AND dompu) OR (kandidat AND taliwang) OR (kandidat AND selong) OR (bawaslu AND ntb) OR (bawaslu AND lombok) OR (bawaslu AND mataram) OR (bawaslu AND sumbawa) OR (bawaslu AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (bawaslu AND bima) OR (bawaslu AND dompu) OR (bawaslu AND taliwang) OR

	(bawaslu AND selong) OR (calon AND gubernur AND ntb) OR (calon AND gubernur AND lombok) OR (calon AND gubernur AND mataram) OR (calon AND gubernur AND sumbawa) OR (calon AND gubernur AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (calon AND gubernur AND bima) OR (calon AND gubernur AND dompu) OR (calon AND gubernur AND taliwang) OR (calon AND gubernur AND selong) OR (pilkada AND ntb) OR (pilkada AND lombok) OR (pilkada AND mataram) OR (pilkada AND sumbawa) OR (pilkada AND nusa AND tenggara AND barat) OR (pilkada AND bima) OR (pilkada AND dompu) OR (pilkada AND taliwang) OR (pilkada AND selong)
<b>West Sumatera</b>	(mahyeldi AND ansharullah) OR (vasko AND ruseimy) OR "mahyeldi-vasko" OR (epyardi AND asda) OR (ekos AND albar) OR "epyardi-ekos" OR "muhammad iqbal-amasrul" OR (fadly AND amran) OR (maigus AND nasir) OR "hendri septa-hidayat" OR (kpu AND padang) OR (kpu AND minang) OR (kpu AND sumbar) OR (kpu AND sumatera AND barat) OR (kpu AND painan) OR (kpu AND payakumbuh) OR (kpu AND solok) OR (kpu AND bukittinggi) OR (kpu AND pariaman) OR (kpu AND payakumbuh) OR (kpu AND agam) OR (pemilu AND padang) OR (pemilu AND minang) OR (pemilu AND sumbar) OR (pemilu AND sumatera AND barat) OR (pemilu AND painan) OR (pemilu AND payakumbuh) OR (pemilu AND solok) OR (pemilu AND bukittinggi) OR (pemilu AND pariaman) OR (pemilu AND payakumbuh) OR (pemilu AND agam) OR (cagub AND padang) OR (cagub AND minang) OR (cagub AND sumbar) OR (cagub AND sumatera AND barat) OR (cagub AND painan) OR (cagub AND payakumbuh) OR (cagub AND solok) OR (cagub AND bukittinggi) OR (cagub AND pariaman) OR (cagub AND payakumbuh) OR

(cagub AND agam) OR (cabup AND padang) OR (cabup AND minang) OR (cabup AND sumbar) OR (cabup AND sumatera AND barat) OR (cabup AND painan) OR (cabup AND payakumbuh) OR (cabup AND solok) OR (cabup AND bukittinggi) OR (cabup AND pariaman) OR (cabup AND payakumbuh) OR (cabup AND agam) OR (cawagub AND padang) OR (cawagub AND minang) OR (cawagub AND sumbar) OR (cawagub AND sumatera AND barat) OR (cawagub AND painan) OR (cawagub AND payakumbuh) OR (cawagub AND solok) OR (cawagub AND bukittinggi) OR (cawagub AND pariaman) OR (cawagub AND payakumbuh) OR (cawagub AND agam) OR (cawalkot AND padang) OR (cawalkot AND minang) OR (cawalkot AND sumbar) OR (cawalkot AND sumatera AND barat) OR (cawalkot AND painan) OR (cawalkot AND payakumbuh) OR (cawalkot AND solok) OR (cawalkot AND bukittinggi) OR (cawalkot AND pariaman) OR (cawalkot AND payakumbuh) OR (cawalkot AND agam) OR (calon AND walikota AND padang) OR (calon AND walikota AND minang) OR (calon AND walikota AND sumbar) OR (calon AND walikota AND sumatera AND barat) OR (calon AND walikota AND painan) OR (calon AND walikota AND payakumbuh) OR (calon AND walikota AND solok) OR (calon AND walikota AND bukittinggi) OR (calon AND walikota AND pariaman) OR (calon AND walikota AND payakumbuh) OR (calon AND walikota AND agam) OR (kampanye AND padang) OR (kampanye AND minang) OR (kampanye AND sumbar) OR (kampanye AND sumatera AND barat) OR (kampanye AND painan) OR (kampanye AND payakumbuh) OR (kampanye AND solok) OR (kampanye AND bukittinggi) OR (kampanye AND pariaman) OR (kampanye AND payakumbuh) OR

	<p>(kampanye AND agam) OR (kandidat AND padang) OR (kandidat AND minang) OR (kandidat AND sumbar) OR (kandidat AND sumatera AND barat) OR (kandidat AND painan) OR (kandidat AND payakumbuh) OR (kandidat AND solok) OR (kandidat AND bukittinggi) OR (kandidat AND pariaman) OR (kandidat AND payakumbuh) OR (kandidat AND agam) OR (bawaslu AND padang) OR (bawaslu AND minang) OR (bawaslu AND sumbar) OR (bawaslu AND sumatera AND barat) OR (bawaslu AND painan) OR (bawaslu AND payakumbuh) OR (bawaslu AND solok) OR (bawaslu AND bukittinggi) OR (bawaslu AND pariaman) OR (bawaslu AND payakumbuh) OR (bawaslu AND agam) OR (calon AND gubernur AND padang) OR (calon AND gubernur AND minang) OR (calon AND gubernur AND sumbar) OR (calon AND gubernur AND sumatera AND barat) OR (calon AND gubernur AND painan) OR (calon AND gubernur AND payakumbuh) OR (calon AND gubernur AND solok) OR (calon AND gubernur AND bukittinggi) OR (calon AND gubernur AND pariaman) OR (calon AND gubernur AND payakumbuh) OR (calon AND gubernur AND agam) OR (pilkada AND padang) OR (pilkada AND minang) OR (pilkada AND sumbar) OR (pilkada AND sumatera AND barat) OR (pilkada AND painan) OR (pilkada AND payakumbuh) OR (pilkada AND solok) OR (pilkada AND bukittinggi) OR (pilkada AND pariaman) OR (pilkada AND payakumbuh) OR (pilkada AND agam)</p>
<p><b>Keywords of vulnerable groups</b></p>	<p>cina, china, tionghoa, chinese, cokin, cindo, chindo, shia, syiah, syia, ahmadiyya, ahmadiyah, ahmadiya, ahmadiyyah, transgender, queer, bisexual, bisex, gay, lesbian, lesbong, gangguan jiwa, gangguan mental, lgbt, eljibiti, lgbtq+, lghdtv+, katolik, khatolik, kristen,</p>

kris10, kr1st3n, buta, tuli, bisu, budek, conge, idiot, autis, orang gila, orgil, gila, gendut, cacat, odgj, zionis, israel, jewish, jew, yahudi, joo, anti-christ, anti kristus, anti christ, netanyahu, setanyahu, bangsa pengecut, is ra hell, rohingya, pengungsi, imigran, sakit jiwa, tuna netra, tuna rungu, sinting.

# **REPORT ON HATE SPEECH MONITORING IN THE 2024 INDONESIA REGIONAL ELECTIONS**

